The development of the office of Prime Minister is all of a piece with the remainder of the constitution. No one invented or ever satisfactorily defined the functions of the office. Rather, the role simply emerged at the interface of Parliament and Crown early in the 18th century, the term ‘Prime Minister’ originally being used in a satirical sense. The office has been subject to continuous development, but the main defining features of the office, as we know it today, had been settled early in the 20th century.
Periodically concern has been expressed at the extent of prime ministerial power, most notably in recent years during Thatcher’s dominance in the 1980s and again under Blair. But the power of the office can quickly drain away, and its incumbent can be swiftly removed by action within Parliament (as in 1990). Nevertheless, a number of factors have accentuated concern about prime ministerial power. Party competition has become an exercise in marketing between the technicians of modern democracy, relying on their market research and their focus groups far more than on any ideological commitments. Victory in a general election tends to be widely understood as a personal mandate for a Prime Minister. MPs increasingly are seen as elected to support a particular prime minister with their role seen as much one of taking the ‘good news’ of what the government is doing to their constituents as that of bringing the grievances or aspirations of their constituents to government. We probably now largely have a de facto presidential system but without the checks and balances that apply in a presidential system.
Some see this as a good thing, arguing that it provides for strong and decisive government and avoids the ‘gridlock’ that can characterise presidential systems. But a “preference for strong government over accountable government” (Hugo Young) does place considerable weight on qualities of trust and integrity, which at present appear to be eroding.
There are, however, other reasons for expressing concern about the office of Prime Minister. Among these is the weakening of civil society as bodies such as the churches, the universities and the trade unions experience greater difficulty in formulating and gaining a public hearing for their views, and the increased dominance of government. The government has become so great in size, scope and competence. Other institutions by comparison have become weaker, although the power of the media and well-funded lobby groups act as a counter – hence the continual battle for media exposure. Allegedly private institutions find it difficult to command attention as independent centres of authority. ‘Governing’ gives way to ‘governance’, where the government seeks to secure its objectives through varied means of influence rather than direct power. And within government the Prime Minister has assumed an even greater dominance. Is too much power and patronage now concentrated in the holder of this office, at least at times when a clear party majority prevails? Christians should not be complacent about the current condition of the constitution.
No religious or faith criteria are necessary as qualifications for the office of Prime Minister. The Prime Minister holds extensive powers of patronage and also plays a significant role in the appointment of various office holders in the Church of England (notably bishops) but does so through machinery that commands reasonably widespread, though certainly not unanimous, support within the church. There are undoubtedly many Christians who think that the Prime Minister should have no role whatsoever in the making of such appointments, which ought to be entirely a matter for the Church itself. Non-Anglican Prime Ministers have fulfilled this role (the first was Lloyd George). However, if the Prime Minister was a Roman Catholic or a practising Jew there are still statutory bars on him rendering advice to the Sovereign on ecclesiastical matters (though presumably some other cabinet minister could). An interesting illustration of the confidence Church leaders place in the present arrangements was given by the evidence bishops gave to the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Commons on the re-location of the ecclesiastical patronage attaching to the office of the Lord Chancellor. They argued that this should be transferred to the Prime Minister rather than dispersed to bishops or other sources. MPs who heard this were clearly surprised at the supposedly self-interested concern of the Church of England to avoid what was described as possible ‘disestablishment creep’.
